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ROADMAPS AFTER CORBYN
Parties, Classes, Political Cultures
Let me begin with a political fantasy. I suspect it was shared by many in the early months of 2020, after Corbyn had been replaced by Keir Starmer as Labour leader and a leaked internal report had disclosed the extent to which party officials had tried 
to sabotage Corbyn’s leadership—and after Starmer settled a libel claim 
with them, even though lawyers had advised the party had a strong case. 
The political fantasy went something like this. Corbyn, now a humble 
backbencher, seizes the initiative and leverages his considerable political 
capital to lead a small group of left mps out of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party and in doing so overcomes at a stroke the huge start-up barriers 
to a new political party which our first -past-the-post system imposes. In 
the first instance, such a breakaway would be a pole of attraction for a 
significant chunk of the membership who were inspired to join Labour 
as a result of Corbyn’s leadership (let us say, 100,000 people).
There was in this period a window of opportunity for the new party to 
eclipse the hapless Lib Dems as the third uk-wide party at Westminster 
in both number of mps—the Lib Dems have eleven—and possibly mem-
bership base. It would establish scale, and with scale comes a presence 
in the mass media—or at least sections of it—and esteem and cred-
ibility (not with the establishment, but with the people). It would be 
in a position to change the terms of the debate, shift the parameters of 
political conversations, just as the Corbyn leadership managed to do in 
a number of areas, in their best moments. In short, it would be in a 
position to engage in the battle for hegemony, for moral and political 
leadership, something which most of the Labour Party for most of its 
history, has been singularly unwilling to understand or contemplate. Just 
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as importantly, the new political formation would have solved the psycho-
logical problem that bedevils small left-wing groupuscules of attracting 
people to a project that seems condemned to remain on the margins of 
public discourse. The new set-up would almost certainly have encour-
aged the more adventurous unions, such as Unite, under the leadership 
of Len McCluskey, to begin at the very least to diversify their political 
funding portfolio and unlock additional resources to help it grow. The 
result could have been electrifying in my view. 
But it remained a fantasy. A collective inertia prevailed, a lack of inde-
pendent initiative and agency, a lack of leadership and a failure to learn 
the lessons that the recent history lays before us. A veil has been cast 
over events by those who ought to have the greatest interest in scrutiniz-
ing what has occurred. Even the subsequent suspension of Corbyn from 
the plp in October 2020, on the most spurious grounds imaginable, 
did little to disturb the fundamental assumptions.1 ‘Stay and fight’ came 
the cry from Labour mp John McDonnell, formerly Shadow Chancellor, 
as many ripped up their party cards in disgust. ‘Unite against the real 
enemy, the Tories’, cried the left as it appealed for Corbyn’s suspension 
to be rescinded, reduced to begging for re-admittance to a house that 
does not want it. 
Nothing it seems has been learned. That the Starmer leadership is more 
bent on crushing the left in its own party than taking on the Tories and 
Liberal Democrats is barely discussed. The analogy would be the Scottish 
Nationalists offering the party leadership to fervent unionists. Post-
Corbyn, the left bows its head and hands back the keys, as acquiescent to 
the status quo as the Labour Party’s tradition of Labourism has been vis-
à-vis the institutions of the British state.2 Clinging to Labour or orbiting 
1 Corbyn was suspended after the publication of an Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission inquiry into allegations of anti-Semitism in the Labour Party. Corbyn 
accepted the findings of the report but noted that the scale of the problem had been 
exaggerated by political opponents and the media. For this, Corbyn was suspended, 
then reinstated but without the party whip. There is considerable evidence that a 
significant percentage of the public did have a grossly distorted perception of the 
numbers of investigations that had been opened up on members for alleged anti-
Semitism. See Greg Philo, et al., Bad News for Labour: Antisemitism, the Party and 
Public Belief, London 2019. See also Daniel Finn, ‘A Fabricated Crisis’, nlr–Sidecar, 
1 February 2021.
2 See Stuart Hall’s The Hard Road to Renewal, London and New York 2021 [1988], 
for a very valuable critique of both Fabian-style social democracy and Labourism.
wayne: Britain 39
around it guarantees political paralysis. Yet the absence of a debate on 
the strategic lessons to be learned is not something the left can afford. 
Party apparatus
Corbyn’s defeat was not some swing in the pendulum of alternating 
power between the left and the right. Corbynism did not represent the 
beginnings of a revivification of the Labour Party as a progressive force. 
Instead it was both a last-gasp attempt to wrest the party away from the 
neoliberal trajectory it has been pursuing with ever greater velocity since 
the rise of Blair in the 1990s and a definitive historical experiment, 
designed to answer the burning question: can the left win inside the 
Labour Party? Could the party be transformed into a vehicle for socialist 
advance, having elected its most left-wing leader since George Lansbury 
in the early 1930s? The answer is now in, and it is flatly, I think, a 
resounding No. There is unlikely to be a next time, but even if there 
were, the same fundamental weakness in any such project would reap-
pear as abundantly and as fatally as it did for the Corbyn experiment: 
the left cannot fight and win against the political establishment and the 
media establishment, still less the concentrated power of capital beyond 
those guardians of the social order, while it is also fighting the right-wing 
majority in the upper ranks of its own party. 
That ‘right’—a term which we must shortly abandon for an analysis 
more attuned to the heterogeneity of forces at work—inside the party 
now inhabits the same ideological universe as the Conservatives (and 
the Liberal Democrats) and feels happier with the Tories in government 
than with Labour under a left-wing leadership. Blair articulated the 
collective sentiments of the Labour right very clearly during the 2015 
Labour leadership campaign, after Corbyn unexpectedly became the 
front runner: ‘Let me make my position clear: I wouldn’t want to win 
on an old-fashioned leftist platform. Even if I thought it was the route to 
victory, I wouldn’t take it.’3 And neither, it turned out, would much of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. Thus electoral sabotage, to engineer a shift 
back to power for the right following defeat, is a default strategy that will 
eventually succeed against a traumatized party membership. And the 
willingness to force it through will never change because a breach with 
 3 Jon Stone, ‘Tony Blair Says He Wouldn’t Want a Left-Wing Labour Party to Win an 
Election’, Independent, 22 July 2015. 
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the social-democratic past is baked in. The right’s commanding position 
within the party apparatus gives it all the tools it needs to mount block-
ing and sabotage campaigns. 
A leader such as Corbyn can never launch the honest conversation about 
the past history of the party that is required or articulate a thoroughgoing 
critique of present party practices, such as the role of Labour-controlled 
councils in austerity or gentrification of the cities.4 A left-wing govern-
ment, should it ever come to pass with a small majority, would immediately 
be held hostage by the Labour right over its legislative programme. 
Additionally, the plp’s attacks on the left and their smear campaigns of the 
leadership, magnified at every turn by a hostile media, carry much greater 
weight with the public than they would if they came from political oppo-
nents formally outside a left-party vehicle. Labour’s ‘broad church’ and 
calls for unity are always on the terms of the right; the left must accept the 
right’s dominance, but the same loyalty to party over factions will never 
be reciprocated in those brief and highly irregular moments when the left 
grows in strength. Something has to give. So far it has been the Labour 
left’s backbone.
1. political cultures
What makes Gramsci such an inspiring thinker is the way he is able to 
integrate what he calls a ‘molecular’ mode of analysis within the frame-
work of historical materialism. He refers to this approach in his discussion 
of the formation and development of a political party.5 The molecular here 
meant the empirical details of a party’s formation from numerous sources. 
But molecular also meant for Gramsci, as the concept of the ‘concrete’ did 
for Marx, a methodology sensitive to the salient historical relations that 
demand conceptual refinement. So Gramsci famously unpacks and gives 
‘a considerable extension’ to the concept of the intellectual in the context 
of the historical transformation of social relations under capitalism.6 So 
too we need to unpack what the ‘right’ means inside Labour, since this 
term is a pragmatic shorthand useful for everyday political discourse but 
4 Phil Hubbard, The Battle for the High Street: Retail Gentrification, Class and Disgust, 
London 2017.
5 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, eds, London 1998, p. 194.
6 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 10.
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not necessarily the precise conceptualization needed to understand the 
contradictions at work. A conceptual model that can give us some ana-
lytical and strategic orientation towards the dynamics and flux of political 
contestation is required. 
The Labour Party is a contradictory amalgam of different political tradi-
tions, in many ways a ‘mutant’ formation, according to Perry Anderson.7 
There is conservatism (e.g. Blue Labour), economic liberalism, social lib-
eralism, labourism, social democracy, even socialism. A political party is 
defined not by the exclusive ownership of political philosophies, which 
in fact are shared with others, but by the proportions and relations of 
these political cultures within the party structures, and by the hierarchy of 
resources of power and prestige that agents identifying with these political 
cultures can mobilize. Socialism obviously is the most residual in num-
bers, power and prestige within the Labour Party; in practice even those 
who would self-describe as socialists in their personal beliefs, espouse at 
the level of policy essentially social-democratic proposals, understandably, 
given forty years of defeat. Judging by the surprise election of Corbyn in 
2015 under the new one-person one-vote system, and then his re-election 
in 2016 facing the plp’s candidate Owen Smith, social-democratic senti-
ments have their base in the party membership. Judging by the way the 
plp has effectively declared war on the members—with individuals being 
expelled for absurd reasons and constituency parties suspended—social 
democracy appeals to only a minority of Labour mps. In June 2016, in 
the wake of the Brexit Referendum, 172 Labour mps voted in favour of a 
motion of no confidence in Corbyn; only 40 mps voted against. If Blair’s 
leadership of the party is taken as an index, then economic liberalism and 
social liberalism constitute the hegemonic political forces within the plp. 
Labourism, too intellectually decrepit to assert any autonomous leader-
ship, is sullenly subordinate to Labour’s new master discourse, Deputy 
Leader Angela Rayner the new John Prescott to Starmer’s Blair.
Rise of social liberalism
Social liberalism is a historically variable philosophy. In its more heroic 
earlier period it emerged as a break with economic liberalism, in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. This was the ‘new liberalism’, seeded 
by philosophers such as T. H. Green, D. G. Ritchie and L. T. Hobhouse, 
7 Perry Anderson, ‘Ukania Perpetua?’, nlr 125, Sept–Oct 2020, p. 95.
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which undertook the work of rehabilitating the state in liberal thought as 
the necessary co-ordinating force without which the good society, once 
expected to emerge naturally from the market, would remain still-born.8 
It eventually fed into the Fabian-led political alliance between liberalism 
and the labour movement, and provided much of the intellectual heavy 
lifting for the social-democratic compromise—Keynesianism, the 1942 
Beveridge Report—that emerged piecemeal in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, even under Conservative governments, before being 
institutionalized as a new historic bloc after 1945.9 
For Gramsci, a historic bloc refers to the intra-ruling-class compromise 
that, when successful, is projected downward to include large enough 
sections of the subaltern classes to guarantee effective social peace. 
Hegemony ensues when that social peace is governed more by consent 
and persuasion than by coercion and violence.10 Still, the force of law 
always stands behind this social peace, nipping dissent in the bud before 
it can generalize—for example, arresting leading cadres of the direct-
action opposition, as in the case of the activist group uk Uncut.11 In 
extremis the force of law can become the law of force, but the more 
this is generalized and sustained, the more the hegemony of the historic 
bloc is weakened. The dismantling of the social-democratic historic bloc 
begun by Thatcher in the 1980s was one such moment, when an old 
hegemony was receding, a new one emerging and in the interregnum, 
8 See Mike Wayne, England’s Discontents: Political Cultures and National Identities, 
London 2018 for a fuller discussion of liberalism’s ‘oscillations’ over two centuries.
9 See David Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth Century 
History, London 2018.
10 Consent, however, is not the same as integration into a value consensus, as 
in the Parsonian sociological tradition. This reading of Gramsci is developed by 
Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan Turner in their influential book 
The Dominant Ideology Thesis, London 1980. While a fascinating and challenging 
book that makes a valuable critique of what Gramsci himself called ‘ideologism’, 
it is a fundamental misreading of Gramsci to include him as an exponent of value 
consensus. Consent to the leadership of the ‘universal’ interests of the dominant 
class coalition is entirely compatible with significant value and cultural dissensus. 
11 Tim Street, ‘uk Uncut: Direct Action Against Austerity’, in Nathan Manning, 
ed., Political (Dis)Engagement: The Changing Nature of the ‘Political’, Bristol 2017. 
Following uk Uncut’s occupation of Fortnum and Mason in 2011, 138 people—
‘practically the movement’s entire leadership’—were charged with aggravated 
trespass: Mark Townsend, ‘uk Uncut Accuses Police of Politically Motivated 
Arrests’, Observer, 2 April 2011.
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the law of force could be clearly (perhaps too clearly) seen; no more so 
than in the heavily militarized policing of the 1984–85 miners’ strike. 
Yet by the 1990s, in order to secure its rule, economic liberalism had to 
tilt from brute coercion and start to reproduce itself with a greater role 
for consent. Social liberalism was to become a key ideological resource 
in this, fashioning a rapprochement with economic liberalism after 
decoupling from social democracy. Vis-à-vis this transition, Blairism 
was perhaps not quite the intellectual vacuum Anderson accuses it of 
being in his recent panoramic survey of the long British crisis.12 As the 
embodiment of liberalism’s triumph within the party, Blairism trans-
formed the political cultures of both the Labour Party and subsequently 
the Conservative Party, insofar as the latter tried to remake itself under 
Cameron on the New Labour model. This reversed the earlier pattern 
of Thatcherism influencing New Labour, but the crucial difference was 
that liberalism’s resurgence was lashed to a catastrophic surrender 
on political economy. On the broader cultural terrain, as Žižek noted, 
multiculturalism became the logic of multinational capitalism, and New 
Labour was part of that international trend.13 The openly reactionary 
values of racism, sexism, homophobia and xenophobia exemplified by 
Thatcherism and coupled oddly with international capitalism, were to 
be officially replaced with public commitments to diversity and equal 
opportunity in order to neutralize significant sources of discontent 
within the framework of global economic liberalism.
Economic fractures
Thus social liberalism offers economic liberalism an alternative part-
ner in the battle for political power. At this point the ‘social’ in social 
liberalism undergoes a fundamental change. No longer is it about the 
role of the state as a corrective to capitalism’s tendency to increase 
social stratification. Its role is to guarantee a level playing field of com-
petition, not impose social obligations on capital. The ‘social’ in social 
liberalism becomes a rosily optimistic alternative interpretation of the 
consequences of capitalist markets. Two liberal optics in particular come 
to the fore and define the political terrain going into the new century. 
12 Anderson, ‘Ukania Perpetua?’, pp. 81–2.
13 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism’, 
nlr 1/225, Sept–Oct 1997.
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First, the atomization of community and society is embraced and, 
contra conservatism, is understood as the dismantling of hierarchies 
and barriers that prevent fairness and social mobility. The element of 
meritocracy that was mobilized by Thatcher(ism) came into contradic-
tion with its regressive nationalistic cultural inclinations; but in social 
liberalism, meritocracy found a more credible champion. Hence under 
Blairism the ideology of meritocracy swept across the policy discourse of 
institutions, not just in politics but in education and the cultural indus-
tries as well.14 After 2010, the alliance between the social-liberal wing of 
the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats in the Cameron –Clegg 
coalition government marked a joint party-political inflection of the 
dominance of economic and social liberalism (now without the Labour 
Party). Under austerity, the ‘social’ was increasingly linked to a combi-
nation of meritocracy and charity, with the voluntary and third sector 
stepping in to fill the gulfs in social provision. Hence photo ops of Tory 
mps beaming with pride at their local foodbank.
Second, and more difficult for the left to gain a critical purchase on, 
the international dimension of the capitalist market was celebrated for 
its cosmopolitanism. Of course, Marx also recognized the progressive 
potential of capitalism’s drive to break up national seclusion, tearing 
up ‘feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations’ and establishing a ‘cosmopoli-
tan character to production and consumption in every country.’15 But 
liberalism is one-eyed about the progressive side of capitalism and, in 
its new alliance with economic liberalism, has little to say about the 
destructive aspect of capitalist development. The key political debate on 
this question was of course around the European Union which became, 
following the shock defeat in the 2016 referendum, the totemic govern-
ance structure of Reason itself for much of the liberal middle class. The 
referendum crystallized long germinating trends. ‘The sheer magnitude 
of the fracture between the globalized middle class and the anxious 
majority is clear’, wrote Rob Ford shortly after the 2016 vote. Along with 
Matthew Goodwin, Ford has been an ambivalent chronicler of the ‘older, 
white, socially conservative voters in more economically marginal neigh-
bourhoods’ especially in Labour heartlands.16 
14 See Jo Littler’s account in Against Meritocracy: Culture, Power and Myths of Mobility, 
Abingdon 2018.
15 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Harmondsworth 1985, 
pp. 82–3.
16 Rob Ford, ‘Older ‘left-behind’ voters turned against a political class with values 
opposed to theirs’, Guardian, 25 June 2016.
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A more explicitly leftist account of an emerging hard-right ‘structure of 
feeling’17 conducive to old-style conservativism was provided by Winlow, 
Hall and Treadwell in The Rise of the Right. Ventriloquizing the English 
nationalism that was the subject of their ethnographic research, they 
found a deep hatred of the liberal ‘centre’:
The absurd and immovable commitment these politicians displayed to the 
vague categories of ‘openness’ and ‘diversity’ indicated quite clearly how 
divorced from the real world they had become. The trendy new language 
of multiculturalism, and the actual policies and political commitments that 
underpinned it, marginalized the very communities that during the 20th 
century had enabled the country to grow to become a genuine force on the 
world stage. The white working class were now dismissed as idiotic, slov-
enly and atavistic barbarians . . .18
Nor is this a peculiarly English or British phenomenon, since the forces 
shaping politics are cross-national and international. Christophe Guilluy 
finds a similar cleavage and need to get beyond the terms of the debate of 
the main conservative-liberal interlocutors at work in France.
French society is not divided between enlightened partisans of progress 
and their uncultivated and blinkered adversaries. The true divide is 
between those who stand to gain from globalization, or at least have the 
means to protect themselves against occasional misfortune, and those 
who stand to lose from globalization, who are powerless to withstand its 
merciless onslaught.19
Hence the genius of the 2016 Leave campaign slogan: Take Back 
Control. That could have been contested from the left in both the 2017 
and 2019 elections with something like a promise for a constitutional 
convocation of the kind that has been successful in Venezuela and 
Bolivia, and a step towards a genuine popular sovereignty, a genuine tak-
ing back control. But such a vision would have required a more sweeping 
counter-hegemonic strategy than the left in Labour could manage. The 
question of immigration, linked to cosmopolitanism of course, posed 
17 The term is Raymond Williams’s and refers to emerging sentiments, feelings, 
attitudes that may be picked up by aesthetic practices but which are often under the 
radar of formalized, official institutions. See Marxism and Literature, Oxford 1988, 
pp. 128–35.
18 Simon Winlow, Steve Hall and James Treadwell, The Rise of the Right: English 
Nationalism and the Transformation of Working-Class Politics, Bristol 2017, p. 113.
19 Christophe Guilluy, Twilight of the Elites, New Haven ct 2019, p. 10.
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a particular problem for the left, given its historic commitment to pro-
letarian internationalism and support for those fleeing poverty, state 
terror and war. Although Corbyn tried to re-frame the question in terms 
of reining in the business propensity to use migrants as a means of 
acquiring cheap labour, this was a minority discourse, and certainly not 
supported by most Labour mps, for whom the thought of curtailing the 
freedom of private property to buy labour at the price it could find it, 
was frankly undesirable. 
2. a conceptual model
Moving up a level of abstraction to capture this more schematically, we 
can understand recent political history in terms of a model built around 
the dynamics of competition, alliances, contradictions and, potentially, 
fissures. The principal players are economic liberalism, conservatism 
and social liberalism, all three cutting across party-political entities. As 
Figure 1, below, indicates, the vectors of competition and alliance struc-
ture the relationship between conservatism and liberalism as they vie for 
moral-political leadership of economic liberalism. While they compete 
electorally through their party-entities, they are allied by their shared 
support for economic liberalism. Conservatism and social liberalism are 
to be understood primarily as political cultures and cultural politics, or 
as state and civil-society agents. Economic liberalism essentially entails 
capitalist market dynamics, with minimal social obligations imposed. 
But conservatism and liberalism—in the uk context—represent differ-
ential interpretations of the institutional frameworks within which the 
buying and selling of commodities is to take place. Economic liberalism 
is not simply about unfettering the market, but embedding it in the ‘rule 
of law’.20 If the differences between Blairite liberalism and Thatcherite 
conservatism were, at an economic level, primarily tactical, the differ-
ences on questions of international governance structures and their 
relation to the nation-state have grown to be strategic.
Those differences are theoretically explicable when we classify the 
relation between the political cultures and economic liberalism in 
terms of contradictions. This means that economic liberalism has the 
potential to negate the moral-cultural and political preferences of the 
20 This argument is made by Quinn Slobodian’s history of neoliberal thought in 
Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism, Cambridge ma 2018.
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respective political cultures. Such negations in turn channel back up 
into the competition-alliance dynamic and introduce the potential for 
fissures and fractures in the alliances. The competition starts to move 
outside the boundaries of the hitherto existing policy consensus. The 
uk’s relationship to the eu is the preeminent contemporary example. 
Readers may detect the base–superstructure model at work here, but this 
schema nevertheless aligns with Gramsci’s prioritization of politics—
and we may add, the significance of culture. ‘It may be ruled out’, writes 
Gramsci in his critique of economism, ‘that immediate economic cri-
ses of themselves produce fundamental historical events.’21 Thus the 
financial crisis of 2008 interacted with and was mediated by the political 
cultures in play within the historic bloc, including residual popular nostal-
gia for social democracy, no matter how unrepresented those sentiments 
were by the main political parties or how disorganized their expression.
While social liberalism has promoted economic liberalism since the 
1990s, economic liberalism generates consequences that threaten to 
liquidate the moral-cultural universe of social liberalism. The tendency 
Figure 1: Conflict, Alliance and Contradiction Model
Conservatism Social Liberalism
Economic Liberalism
21 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 184. If my focus is on intra-ruling-
class dynamics—rather than dominant-subaltern dynamics—that is because 
popular initiatives acting independently of the three main political cultures are 









Conflict: Competition + Alliances
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towards monopoly concentrates power in ways that liberalism, if it is 
minded to self-reflexive ruminations, finds problematic; the tendency 
towards uneven development contradicts liberal claims to be ameliorat-
ing conditions for the world’s poor; the tendency towards rent-seeking 
behaviour in the form of land, credit, patents, etc., offends liberal-
ism’s belief that the core of the capitalist system lies in progressive and 
dynamic technological change; the tendency to use authoritarian state 
power and increasingly surveillance offends liberalism’s protection of 
individual rights, while the tendency towards the destruction of material 
security, which economic liberalism generates, threatens to produce the 
regressive nationalism that undermines liberal cosmopolitanism.
Conservative compensations
While conservatism also promotes economic liberalism, it too faces con-
tradictions. Conservatism’s cherished institutions in which the ‘wisdom 
of the ages’ is preserved are threatened by capitalism’s revolutionary 
thirst for change. Economic liberalism’s commodification of the body 
undermines the Christian foundations of conservatism; its atomization 
of social relations erodes those smaller-scale units of social belong-
ing, the family, the community, that conservatism favours; and its ever 
extending internationalism threatens the symbolic and economic foun-
dations of the national imaginary which conservatism has made its own. 
As with liberalism, deepening economic inequality threatens core con-
servative values and institutions. In the present case, the supranational 
British state is in danger of breaking up as subaltern nations, and their 
state complexes (particularly Scotland and Northern Ireland) posit inde-
pendence as a means or an end that will resolve these contradictions.
The close links between cultural politics and political cultures means 
that the latter can turn ‘structures of feeling’ at work in civil society into 
forceful organized outcomes, as with Brexit. However, there are impor-
tant differences between the way this plays out with conservatism and 
with liberalism, stemming in turn from their different relations to eco-
nomic liberalism. For the relationship between economic ‘base’ and 
‘superstructure’ (both state and civil society) in the case of conservatism 
is deeply contradictory rather than isomorphic; yet this is exactly what 
gives conservatism its creative flexibility and cultural energy. By being 
in contradiction with key dynamics of capitalism, conservatism is pow-
erfully mobilized as a compensatory culture. It works typically through 
wayne: Britain 49
the Freudian mechanisms of displacement and condensation, which 
explains why it has such affective power. By contrast, liberalism is a 
more isomorphic extension into political and cultural discourse of at 
least the phenomenal life of capitalism—rationalism, equal exchange, 
the individual as free-floating atom, contractual relations, competition, 
internationally extended value chains, etc. Yet it is precisely this match 
between capitalism’s surface life and liberal political culture that makes 
liberalism less able to offer emotional compensation for the negative 
outcomes of capitalism. This gives conservatism something of an edge 
in abnormal times. Still, the contradictions can be enabling and disa-
bling for both political cultures in their competition with one another, 
depending on what use they and their adversaries can make of them. 
The model therefore needs to be able to cope with complexity, dynamic 
change, structural contradictions and agency. 
Liberalism for example uses capitalism’s internationalist tendencies to 
play a leading role in developing cosmopolitan institutions and cultures. 
The threat posed by the eu in terms of creating new bonds of identity 
and identification that bypass the national imaginary and its institutions, 
where conservatism has always been strong and liberalism has been rela-
tively weak, is precisely why conservatism has the means and the motive 
to react with fury to such endeavours. It was the conservative brand 
of Thatcherism Redux that proved best placed to marshal the various 
discontents of economic liberalism and, through the political arts of dis-
placement, to find a way back from the wilderness years of 1997–2010. 
With the Cameron–Clegg social-liberal project rapidly compromised by 
harsh economic-liberal austerity, a revived attempt to combine an econ-
omy open to international capitalism (but uncoupled from the eu) with 
a political culture of nationalism has increasingly made the running—
and gained rocket boosters after the 2016 Referendum. Its party-political 
representatives were ukip and what became the European Research 
Group wing of the Conservative Party, the two working together in a 
tacit alliance. 
If capitalism’s supranationalism cuts against and contradicts appeals to 
national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity, it is easy enough to por-
tray the insecurities it generates as stemming from eu ‘bureaucracy’, 
metropolitan elites and migrant labour, through the discursive pro-
cesses of displacement and condensation of which ukip’s Nigel Farage 
was a master. Liberalism cannot in fact compete with the discourse of 
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nationalism when the chips are down, for what does it have to counter 
the tangible appeals to place and people, the mythological history or the 
institutional bulwarks of the British state, in which conservatism has prof-
itably invested so much power? For example, in its long moral-political 
struggle against the eu, conservatism grounded the discontents of an 
older generation of voters by mobilizing and reworking their version of 
the national imaginary around the Second World War, with the eu as the 
enemy without and the Germans once again trying to defeat Britain, this 
time through front institutions and without firing a shot.22 
3. classes and parties
Fissures between former partners in a historic bloc vent deep down, 
producing crises between the political philosophies, the parties in 
which they are distributed and the social classes. According to Gramsci, 
politics, understood historically, is the organized orchestration of the 
superstructure with the ‘structure’ (the social classes). When there is a 
significant disagreement between the leading classes as to what actu-
ally is in their collective interests, the bloc undergoes convulsions and 
‘social classes become detached from their traditional parties.’23 In 
broad terms, we have seen this detachment happen in Scotland, with 
the working class breaking with Labour and switching to the snp in 
the early 2000s, in relation to Holyrood, and then in relation to the 
Westminster parliament in 2015, when the snp took 40 of Labour’s 41 
Scottish seats. The main driver here was New Labour’s contempt for the 
social-democratic aspirations of the Scottish working class, aspirations 
which the snp seemed better placed to meet. 
In England, though, working-class allegiances were much more up for 
grabs between parties and political cultures. Generally the shift was to 
the right, towards conservatism, as incarnated by ukip and then by an 
increasingly ‘ukipized’ Conservative Party in the run up to the 2019 
election. In between, at the 2017 election, there was a moment when 
Corbyn’s Labour Party appeared to hold the line and offer a more radi-
cal social-democratic prospectus than the snp, which was increasingly 
22 See Fintan O’Toole’s Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain, London 2019 
for a lively popular account of this ‘war of position’.
23 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 137, 210.
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shifting towards social liberalism. But the cross-currents of Brexit in 
England and the recent break with New Labour in Scotland proved a 
barrier too high to surmount.
Electoral struggles
Elections offer a snapshot of the struggle for hegemony between the 
political cultures, as well as of the parties battling for the leadership of 
those political cultures, with their particular combinations of them. The 
distinction is important. Would ukip or the Tories triumph as the party-
political vehicle for nationalistic conservatism after 2010? Would Labour, 
the snp or Liberal Democrats triumph as the party-political vehicle of lib-
eralism, or alternatively under Corbyn, could Labour redefine itself as a 
return to social democracy? 
In the 2014 European Parliament elections, ukip topped the poll with 
27 per cent of the vote, Labour came second with 25 per cent and the 
Conservatives came third with 23 per cent. ukip’s electoral popularity 
had surged after austerity became the policy response to the 2008 global 
crisis following the arrival of the Coalition government in 2010.24 Thus 
liberal conservatism and social liberalism—the Coalition government—
clearly sowed the seeds for its own defeat on the question of Europe. 
In the general election of 2015, ukip captured nearly 4 million votes, 
just under 13 per cent, eclipsing the Liberal Democrats as a third party. 
Yet the first-past-the-post majoritarian system meant that ukip failed 
to win a single parliamentary seat. It nevertheless saw big increases in 
its working-class electoral base, drawing support ‘along England’s more 
financially disadvantaged east coast, in Kent, Essex, Norfolk, Lincolnshire 
and Yorkshire, and also in the north east where its average share of the 
vote (17 per cent) was its highest across the country.’25
Yet the high barrier to new party representation in parliament meant that 
the votes ukip was now taking from both the Conservatives and Labour 
could be re-canalized, if the concerns mobilizing older, white, financially 
vulnerable and educationally impoverished voters could be recon-
ciled with these parties’ broader political agendas. Of the two, the Tory 
24 Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, The Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for 
the Radical Right in Britain, London 2014, pp. 163–5.
25 Matthew Goodwin, ‘ukip, the 2015 General Election and Britain’s eu 
Referendum’, Political Insight, vol. 6, no. 3, 2015, p.14.
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Party was best placed to do so, since it had the Euro-sceptic European 
Research Group as a high-profile and increasingly powerful lobby 
within it. Labour, by contrast, had a parliamentary body and member-
ship overwhelmingly oriented towards the eu, and that sentiment was 
to be ruthlessly exploited as a wedge issue by Corbyn’s opponents inside 
and outside the party. In 2017, Corbyn’s promise to respect the outcome 
of the Brexit referendum bought space for a renewed social-democratic 
prospectus to get a hearing. Labour won some 12.8 million votes, or 40 
per cent of the total, against the Conservatives’ 13.6 million votes or 42 
per cent. The two main parties squeezed ukip’s vote down to just under 
600,000. Forty-five per cent of ukip voters from the 2015 general elec-
tion voted for the Conservatives, and only 11 per cent went for Labour.26
In 2017, the Conservatives had a net loss of 13 seats and Labour a net 
gain of 30 seats. Labour secured a share of the vote similar to that won 
by Blair in 2001 and a swing of 10 per cent, comparable to Blair’s 1997 
landslide. Of course, as the right within the party were keen to point out, 
although Labour did better than expected, much better, it did not win 
enough seats to achieve power. ‘Labour Road Map’, a report by a rather 
anonymous group of ‘Labour activists’ claiming to champion a ‘prag-
matic Labour vision that widely resonates and persuades the public’, 
concluded that these were ‘results without success’ in terms of winning 
parliamentary seats. Instead, the vote share indicated deepening levels 
of support in constituencies already held by Labour, especially in the cit-
ies and university towns, but not a sufficiently broad appeal to overturn 
Conservative majorities.27 
In mitigation, the line between success and second place was often 
incredibly tight. Excluding Northern Ireland, there were 48 constituency 
seats where the winning majority in 2017 was less than 1,000 votes. Of 
these, Labour came second in 21 seats, losing Southampton, Itchen by 
only 30 votes (Figure 2, below). Had all 21 of those seats changed hands, 
the Conservatives would have been on 303 seats and Labour on 283. The 
total number of votes in play across those 21 seats was 8,584. In an elec-
tion where more than 26 million voted, that is a statistically insignificant 
figure. The point about this is not to play fantasy political outcomes, 
26 Chris Curtis and Matthew Smith, ‘How Did 2015 Voters Cast Their Ballot at the 
2017 General Election?’, YouGov, 22 June 2017, pp. 2–3.
27 ‘Labour Road Map’, Labour List, 10 July 2017. 
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but to remember that the 2017 Labour manifesto was popular, credible 
and—in a sense probably not meant by the Labour Road Map group—a 
‘pragmatic Labour vision’ that ‘persuades the public’. 
Another mitigating point is that the Corbyn leadership was working in 
a context in which it had inherited (rather than caused) the long-term 
negative trend of class de-alignment for which New Labour was respon-
sible (including the catastrophic loss of Scotland). A comparison of the 
three general elections of 2015, 2017 and 2019 indicates that Corbyn 
was partially able to hold those trends in check in 2017. But once com-
bined with Brexit, those trends in many ways came to a culmination in 
2019 (Figure 3, overleaf). In 2015 the Tories outperformed Labour (under 
Edward Miliband’s leadership) in the c1s very comfortably (41 to 29 per 
cent) and tied with them for the c2s. The des still voted substantially 
for Labour (41 to 27 per cent). In 2017, the Conservatives marginally 
increased their hold on the c1s, while Labour increased its share of 
the c1 vote by 11 per cent, a significant improvement. Nevertheless, 
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the Tories increased their hold over the c2 vote by 13 per cent between 
2015 and 2017, a warning sign that Labour could be on the cusp of sig-
nificant shifts and that Theresa May’s strategy of corralling the Brexit 
Leave working-class vote almost worked. What stopped it, partially, was 
that Labour also increased its share of the c2s by 9 per cent. Of course 
these ‘abcde’  uk social categories—devised in the 1960s for use by 
the advertising industry—are not unproblematic, even on their own 
terms. In particular there is evidence that the c2 category is fragmenting 
between those located in the expanding service sectors of the cities and 
university towns, and those in the former industrial heartlands made up 
of small towns and villages in the north.28
In 2017, the Conservatives were also doing well amongst the des 
although Labour managed to stay ahead. But again, there were clear 
signs that the Tories had momentum in class groupings that had his-
torically been Labour strongholds. What was happening in Bolsover, 
a former mining district and historically one of Labour’s safest seats, 
was telling. Left-Labour mp Dennis Skinner’s vote dropped by nearly a 
third between 1997 and 2015, from 35,000 to 22,542. In 2005 Skinner 
28 Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker, ‘Tilting Towards the Cosmopolitan Axis? Political 
Change in England and the 2017 General Election’, Political Quarterly, vol. 88, no. 3, 
July–Sept 2017, pp. 365–6.
2015 2017 2019
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had taken 65 per cent of the vote. Then came Brexit, pressing down 
further on those longer-term trends. In 2017 Skinner’s majority shrank 
again. It was another clear warning sign that the former heartlands in 
the northern small towns were preparing for a historic shift. All it would 
take was a shift on a symbolically loaded issue for quantitative change to 
become qualitative.
Finally, in 2019 the Conservatives secured 45 per cent of the c1s while 
Labour collapsed to 32 per cent. The Conservatives took 47 per cent of 
the c2s while Labour again won only 32 per cent. And the Conservatives 
increased their share of the des to 41 per cent, while Labour fell to 39 
per cent. Labour’s changed stance on Brexit, promising now to hold 
a second referendum on a deal with the eu, could no longer stay the 
momentum towards nationalistic conservatism as the hegemonic solu-
tion to the problem of the 2016 referendum result. Of the 54 seats that 
Labour lost to the Conservatives in 2019, 52 were in areas that had voted 
leave in 2016—including Skinner’s.29 
To Brexit we must add the fact that 2017’s close but not quite good 
enough result terrified Corbyn’s opponents inside and outside 
the Labour Party. Evidence from the leaked dossier on the right’s 
hyper-factionalism showed that Labour’s 2017 campaign was not helped 
by senior staff inside party headquarters, who were working for a defeat 
in the hope that this would trigger Corbyn’s downfall. According to the 
dossier, senior staff bemoaned on WhatsApp evidence of Labour doing 
well in the run-up to the election and were left distraught by the eventual 
result. As the Independent reported: 
An election-night chat log shows that 45 minutes after the exit poll revealed 
that Labour had overturned the Conservative majority, one senior official 
said the result was the ‘opposite to what I had been working towards for the 
last couple of years’, describing themselves and their allies as ‘silent and 
grey-faced’ and in need of counselling.30
It is clear that these political currents in Labour will want to bury the 
memory of the 2017 general election and any evidence that there is pop-
ular support for a left social-democratic agenda.
29 Ell Smith, ‘It was Brexit, not Left-Wing Policies, that Lost Labour this Election’, 
Guardian, 21 December 2019.
30 Jon Stone, ‘Anti-Corbyn Labour Officials Worked to Lose General Election to Oust 
Leader, Leaked Dossier Finds’, Independent, 13 April 2020. 
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4. labour’s contradictions
In retrospect, when Labour Party members (twice) defied the wisdom of 
their mps and elected Corbyn as their leader, this was, as Anderson notes, 
‘a gust of enthusiasm, not confined to youth, attracted by sheer novelty, 
rather than driven by conviction.’31 Digging into this unfortunately accu-
rate assessment a little more, we can say that while the membership 
appeared briefly willing to consider a rupture with economic liberalism, 
they remained in thrall to the hegemony of social liberalism, no more 
so than on the question of the eu. Although they wore the T-Shirts, 
‘Love Corbyn, Hate Brexit’, psychologically and politically, they were 
transitioning away from Corbyn in favour of ‘lifestyle horizons’.32 As 
Michael Chessum, a Momentum activist and national organizer for the 
pro-Remain lobby, Another Europe is Possible, warned in the Guardian: 
‘Labour cannot expect to demoralize its activist base by choosing to 
implement a policy they regard as a fundamental affront to their values, 
and then just talk about school funding instead.’33 
The Corbyn leadership’s greatest electoral triumph, the 2017 destruc-
tion of the Tory majority bequeathed to May by Cameron, was also, as 
the cunning of history would have it, the foundation of its downfall. For 
it emboldened a Remain campaign that had been practically dead with 
the prospect of being able to block Brexit in parliament. The 2017 party 
conference season saw the launch of the Labour Campaign for a Single 
Market, backed by openly anti-Corbyn right-wing Labour mps such as 
Chris Leslie, Chuka Umunna and Stella Creasy and pulling in wider sup-
port. The 2018 Labour Party conference was flooded with 150 motions on 
Brexit, 84 of which specifically called for a people’s vote. These motions 
drew inspiration from a plethora of organizations: Another Europe is 
Possible; Love Socialism, Hate Brexit; Labour for a Socialist Europe and 
Open Labour. 
On the eve of the 2018 conference, a YouGov poll found high levels of 
support for a second Brexit vote amongst trade-union members: 56 per 
cent of gmb members, 59 per cent of Unite members and 66 per cent 
31 Anderson, ‘Ukania Perpetua?’, p. 100.
32 Anderson, ‘Ukania Perpetua?’, p. 94.
33 Michael Chessum, ‘If Corbyn Helps the Tories Deliver Brexit, it Will Be a Disaster 
for Labour’, Guardian, 9 April 2019.
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of Unison members supported a second vote. In part, this may reflect 
the shift towards a better qualified, public-sector membership within 
the uk’s now much smaller trade-union movement, covering 24 per 
cent of employees, down from 53 per cent in 1979. Unionization rates 
are higher among those in managerial and supervisory roles, among 
middle-income as opposed to lower-income earners and among those 
with a university degree, compared to those with no further-education 
qualifications. And while public-sector workers make up only 18 per cent 
of the uk labour force, they constitute 64 per cent of trade-union mem-
bers. 34 YouGov also found that 86 per cent of Labour members wanted a 
second referendum and only 8 per cent were opposed.35 This may partly 
be explained by the fact that Labour Party membership has, since New 
Labour, increasingly become middle class, offering less opportunity for 
members to come into contact with viewpoints outside their class bubble. 
A 2002 study provided evidence that the socio-economic demographics 
of Labour membership changed in the 1990s, with a growth in the ‘sala-
riat’ from one-half to two-thirds, while the proportion of working-class 
members fell from one quarter to one-seventh.36 By the time Corbyn was 
leader, 77 per cent of the membership fell into the abc1s categories for 
social-class identification according to one study.37 The push for a sec-
ond referendum fed into a deepening class-culture fissure between the 
membership and important segments of Labour’s working-class elec-
toral base, for whom an important democratic principle (respecting the 
referendum outcome) was now intertwined with existential questions of 
identity (the sovereign nation).
For the membership, however, an opposing identity-politics position 
was forming in a dialogue of the deaf. Here an important democratic 
principle (informed debate) was now intertwined with existential ques-
tions of identity (Britain as part of a European social-liberal polity). 
Watching young people chant Corbyn’s name at the Glastonbury Festival 
34 Peter Kellner, ‘Why YouGov poll shows support for a people's Brexit vote is solid’, 
Guardian, 8 September 2018. beis, ‘Trade Union Membership, uk 1995–2020: 
Statistical Bulletin’, 27 May 2021. 
35 Jim Packard, ‘Poll Shows 86 per cent of Labour Members Want a New Brexit 
Vote’, Financial Times, 22 September 2018.
36 Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, New Labour Grassroots: The Transformation of the 
Labour Party Membership, Basingstoke 2002, p. 37.
37 Tim Bale, Paul Webb and Monica Poletti, ‘Grassroots: Britain’s Party Members—
Who They Are, What They Think and What They Do’, Mile End Institute, qmu, 
January 2018, p. 7.
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two weeks after the June 2017 election, the leadership cadre of social lib-
eralism might have seen the opportunity to use the eu as a wedge issue. 
While Corbyn’s supporters were open to policy sentiments that offered a 
route back to social democracy (now anathema to social liberalism) they 
were also aligned to—that is, under the hegemony of—cultural values 
much closer to liberalism, of which the eu seemed to be the single most 
important symbol. In this, the links between social liberalism’s leader-
ship cadre and important sectors of the media were crucial in shaping 
broader public perceptions of Corbyn’s leadership. 
Driving the wedge
Gramsci had noted that national newspapers—he cited The Times in 
England and Corriere della Sera in Italy—can have important leadership 
functions, even on political parties, acting as an alternative ‘intellectual 
High Command’.38 In assessing the role of the Guardian as an intellec-
tual High Command to weaken the Corbyn leadership we might begin 
by noting how quickly they set the terms for the later monstering of 
the man and his politics. Three days after Corbyn won the leadership in 
2015, leading Guardian columnist Rafael Behr wrote an article describ-
ing Corbynism as ‘a kind of Faragism of the left’ (the left and the right as 
mirror images of each other), as not competent in professional politics 
(a rich seam that would be mined ad nauseam) and as representing a 
‘contempt for Parliament’, a trope that allowed liberalism to relive its 
worst Cold War days. The result was ‘bad for all moderate politicians’, we 
were told. Already, at this early stage, the Guardian had identified three 
frames that were to dominate its coverage of Corbyn.39 
At this point many of the online readers’ comments below the piece were 
critical of Behr. The emerging gap between the Guardian’s editorial line 
and sections of its readership perhaps reflected the one that had opened 
up between the plp and the party membership. But there was one point 
of attack that Behr made, a fourth frame, which received less attention 
below the line, presumably because of its potential to be a wedge issue. 
This was his argument about Corbyn’s ‘obvious dislike for a European 
project he sees as the conduit for corporate interests and pro-auster-
ity economics’. This frame—later elaborated as Corbyn’s dishonesty, 
38 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 148–9.
39 Rafael Behr, ‘This Faragism of the Left will Leave Behind a Loathing of all Politics’, 
Guardian, 15 September 2015.
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secret desire for Brexit, stubborn refusal to back the obvious need for a 
‘People’s Vote’, etc—combined with and supported by the others, and 
already in place before Corbyn’s leadership was three days old, provided 
the ammunition for a sustained assault. The Guardian specializes in 
wringing its hands at the state of the world, but when a policy came 
along offering to address some of those wrongs even only modestly, 
its response was to launch a vicious propaganda campaign to ensure it 
never came to pass. 
Brexit was a double wedge issue, the gift that kept giving for Corbyn’s 
opponents. It helped force a rift between the cultural values of Corbyn’s 
supporters and their initial backing for an economic programme that 
broke with economic liberalism. It also created a fatal fissure between 
the membership and the broader electoral base in the northern con-
stituencies. Another related issue that limited the political culture of the 
membership was their structural role within the party, a subaltern role 
that the members have deeply internalized. When the plp declared war 
on the membership, the membership did not respond in kind. Behr’s 
jibe about Corbyn’s supposed ‘contempt’ for parliament, an institution 
in which he has spent most of his working life, may have been provoked 
in part by hopes that Labour would become more of a social movement 
under his leadership.40 Corbyn represents a strand of left thinking that 
has a critique (which is not the same as contempt) of an exclusively 
parliamentary focus for the very good reason that such a focus cements 
politics into the historic bloc. As Stuart Hall noted, the Labour Party is 
exceptionally good at failing to connect with ‘popular feelings’ and this is 
intimately connected to its fetishization of parliamentarism to the exclu-
sion of any political space or practice outside the ‘parliamentary mould’. 
Any political practice not emanating from or directed to the House of 
Commons ‘produces in its leadership the deepest traumas and the most 
sycophantic poems of praise for parliamentarism.’41
Writing shortly after the 2017 general election, Hilary Wainwright linked 
the prospect of a Corbyn government to a long running theme in her 
work, the need to counter the hostile retaliation of the established power 
structures with ‘power-as-a-transformative-capacity’.42 These arguments 
40 Behr, ‘This Faragism of the Left’. 
41 Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal, p. 207.
42 Hilary Wainwright, ‘New Model Activism: Putting Labour in Office and the 
People in Power’, Red Pepper, 22 September 2017.
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are well rehearsed on the left, but it must have been alarming for the 
social-liberal hegemons to see the leader of the Labour Party mull-
ing the importance of popular power as a counter to state and capital. 
Instead of consecrating the split between political power and material 
reproduction—a split that channels all politics to accept private monop-
oly control of vast productive assets—this threatened to start tackling 
the economic dimension of political power, and the political dimension 
of economic power, the first steps towards a realistic strategy of social-
ist transformation.43 Hence the scorn poured on Corbyn’s aspirations, 
the cries that Corbyn was not serious about winning elections, that he 
was not ‘professional’, that he threatened to turn Labour into a rag-tag 
protest movement. 
Interestingly, in the 1990s, both Blair and Brown tried to revitalize local 
party constituencies, as the torpor of the old bureaucratic-Labourist tra-
dition had whittled away at membership numbers. But the model of 
community activity that they had in mind was more along the lines of 
polite civic participation for a newly enlarged middle-class membership, 
rather than engagement in working-class struggles. In the mid-1990s 
party membership began to rise as disgust with the political and moral 
corruption of the Conservative Party grew. From around 270,000 in 
1993, it rose to 400,000 in 1997 but then declined rapidly to 200,000 
by 2009 as it became clear that Blair and Brown had completed the lib-
eral revolution of Labour policy.44 By 2015 it was under 200,000, before 
Corbyn’s rise almost trebled that number, with party membership climb-
ing to a high of 575,000 in July 2017.45 
The necessary disconnection between party membership and activism 
produces a contradiction for the dominant model, namely declining 
numbers and vitality. Yet it is a price that has to be paid in observance to 
what we may call the pmq model. The weekly jousts between the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition are vital for those inside 
the Westminster bubble, although for the vast majority of people, they 
are utterly irrelevant. But the importance of pmqs may be taken as a 
symbol of the domination of the Parliamentary Labour Party over the 
43 István Mészáros, The Necessity of Social Control, New York 2015, p. 189.
44 Hugh Pemberton and Mark Wickham-Jones, ‘Labour’s Lost Grassroots: The Rise 
and Fall of Party Membership’, British Politics, vol. 8, 2013, pp. 7–8.
45 Lukas Audickas, Noel Dempsey, Philip Loft, ‘Membership of uk Political Parties’, 
House of Commons Briefing Paper no. sn05125, 9 August 2019, pp. 10–11.
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membership, evident in the relative ease with which mps have fought 
off mandatory reselection even when it was available as a trigger to the 
membership.46 While Momentum brought a welcome activist support 
base for the Corbyn leadership and innovative campaign ideas about 
the use of social media,47 its political positions on key questions, such 
as Europe or the anti-Semitism smear campaign, were weak, naive and 
uninformed by hard-headed analysis and political culture. 
5. class feelings
In February 2020, just two months after Corbyn’s shattering defeat, I 
was at the Soho Theatre in London watching Chris McGlade, a comedian 
and political activist from Redcar, Teeside. McGlade was evidently enjoy-
ing himself as he upended liberal metropolitan assumptions with his 
non-racist, non-sexist critique of political correctness. McGlade is also 
an ‘anti-globalist’, an ambiguous political discourse for sure, evident 
in the fact that he unabashedly declared that in the 2019 general elec-
tion he had voted Conservative for the first time. He was not alone: the 
Redcar constituency has just elected a Conservative candidate for the 
first time. McGlade is an example of what Gramsci called an organic 
intellectual, someone with a close lived relationship with the needs of a 
social group and who can articulate those needs and interests in a per-
suasive and compelling fashion, in a language that is widely understood; 
someone who can organize opinions and perceptions, but typically 
also action and behaviour.48
The electoral choice in 2019 of McGlade and the 18,810 other people 
who voted Tory in the Redcar constituency, along with his whole per-
formance that night at the Soho Theatre, with its self-conscious critique 
of self-satisfied liberalism, speaks volumes about the growing distance 
of Labour, the labour movement and the British left generally from the 
working class. When significant sections of that class moved, as in 2019, 
46 Eric Shaw, ‘Mandatory Reselection: Lessons from Labour’s Past’, Constitution 
Unit, 8 November 2018.
47 See Sarah Pickard, ‘Momentum and the Movementist “Corbynistas”’, in Sarah 
Pickard and Judith Bessant, eds, Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of 
Crises, London 2018.
48 See Mike Wayne and Deirdre O’Neill, ‘On Intellectuals’, in Considering Class: 
Theory, Culture and the Media in the 21st Century, Leiden 2018.
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then all the clever social-media campaigns launched by Momentum 
were left stranded. The crisis and the tragedy of the left is here in micro-
cosm, as an intelligent, articulate ‘anti-globalist’ expresses the collective 
predisposition to vote for a party of hedge-fund managers and other 
organs of finance capital, such as the last two Conservative Chancellors 
of the Exchequer, former senior-level men from Deutsche Bank and 
Goldman Sachs respectively. 
A comedian may be an organic intellectual, but in a political party intel-
lectuals of different types and from different strata are fused together 
for long-term effective action.49 The fissure between the working class 
and the middle class is evident in the dominance of the middle class in 
Labour and amongst Labour mps. The percentage of Labour mps from 
manual-work backgrounds was one third in 1951, but it is less than one 
in ten today.50 The trends driving this transformation are multiple and 
powerful, so much so that it is impossible for them to be reversed by an 
organization not completely dedicated to the task. It cannot be achieved 
by a minority within an organization otherwise content to continue with 
the current, or even a majority that lacks power over unaccountable 
party apparatuses. It is clear that the limits of Labour’s ambitions in this 
regard will be to offer the working class some Labour version of con-
servatism, meaning a minimal economic programme, geared primarily 
to help certain sections of capital (such as transport or housing) backed 
up with plenty of political-cultural compensations (strong on defence, 
law and order, immigration, etc) that are ineffective at dealing with root 
causal problems but may serve to keep this segment of the working class 
passive and acquiescent.
For a party to reconnect the middle class with organic intellectuals from 
the working class is to achieve in embryo and against the odds the task 
that must be generalized throughout civil society and the state. It can-
not be done without a reckoning with neoliberal liberalism, which the 
Labour Party cannot begin to accomplish. And without such a recon-
nection there can be no political progress. The left will continue to fall 
under the political and moral leadership of liberalism, and important 
sections of the working class will be pulled further into the political and 
cultural orbit of conservatism. McGlade was full of class feeling and 
49 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p.15.
50 Gavin Thompson, et al., ‘Olympic Britain: Social and Economic Changes Since the 
1908 and 1948 London Games’, House of Commons Library, 26 July 2012, p. 146.
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consciousness at the Soho Theatre, an example that value dissensus is 
not incompatible with a willingness to delegate political leadership to 
the dominant class group by voting Conservative. Unless the left can 
engage and intervene, it will not be able to inflect such class feelings 
into an alternative conception of the national-popular. Such engagement 
would be a learning experience for all sides. Among the huge barriers to 
be overcome in repairing the unravelling of solidarities, is the deep class 
resentment and suspicion now emanating from the working class to the 
middle-class ‘left’, whose priorities seem more and more remote every 
day from working-class lifeworlds. 
A new social democracy?
In February 2019, Labour’s Deputy Leader Tom Watson, who was busy 
undermining the Corbyn leadership at every turn, announced that he was 
setting up a Labour group of backbenchers dedicated to ‘social democ-
racy’ to broaden the party’s appeal. You have to admire the chutzpah. It 
was part of the discursive framing of Corbyn’s leadership as ‘extreme’, as 
outside the progressive traditions of the political mainstream. The real-
ity is that the majority of the plp abandoned social democracy and that 
Corbyn’s programme was a modest attempt at reviving that political tra-
dition. It is, as Tariq Ali memorably put it, the ‘centre’ that is extreme.51 If 
by social democracy we mean redistribution of wealth from the rich to 
the rest via high taxation, converted into socialized provision and wel-
fare support, then neither the plp nor the various ‘Third Way’ apologists 
are social democrats anymore but hybrids of conservatism and liberal-
ism re-aligned.52 If by social democracy we mean imposing significant 
social obligations on capital and controlling its international power, 
then the power-bloc in the Labour Party will never allow it. If we mean 
re-empowering organized labour by dismantling some of the most 
restrictive trade-union laws in the Western world, then again, social 
democracy has few advocates at the Palace of Westminster. If we mean 
reviving public services by taking privatized utilities out of private own-
ership and driving marketization and corporate contractors out of public 
funding of services, then that is a vision too large and a shift too historic 
for the British state (or indeed the eu) to admit as a legitimate project.
51 Tariq Ali, The Extreme Centre: A Second Warning, London and New York 2018.
52 For an example of the shrunken ambitions of Third Way discussions, see Sarah 
Hale, Will Leggett and Luke Martell, eds, The Third Way and Beyond: Criticism, 
Futures, Alternatives, Manchester 2004.
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The 2017 Labour Party Manifesto was modest when measured against 
some of these social-democratic objectives. An investment bank to fund 
infrastructure projects, an idea borrowed from such bastions of revolu-
tionary socialism as Germany and the Nordic countries; ‘moving towards’ 
a 20:1 gap between the boardroom and the lowest paid; corporation tax 
raised but still amongst the lowest in the major developed economies; 
the City left entirely alone; the co-operative sector to be doubled in size, 
bringing it in line with the land of Free Enterprise across the Atlantic; 
energy, water and rail brought back into public ownership; a commit-
ment to renewables and nuclear; the abolition of university tuition fees 
and the reintroduction of maintenance grants; a modest enhancement 
of trade-union rights; a very modest council and housing-association 
building programme (100,000 per year by the end of the parliament); 
some new rights for renters that fell well short of a declaration of war on 
the landlord class—and so on. Modest as the policy offering was, what 
the ruling bloc feared was not any single one of the proposals, or even 
all of them put together, but rather the shift in direction a Corbyn vic-
tory would mark, the momentum that might develop and the spectre of 
an excess of clamorous democratic demands being reawakened at the 
expense of the power and wealth of the dominant groups.53
The left’s relationship to social democracy, though, also needs rethink-
ing. It tends to associate the term with the ossification of the later 
post-war period, a great lumbering behemoth clamping down on ‘indus-
trial modernity’ according to Tom Nairn, skirting at times dangerously 
close to economic liberalism in The Break-Up of Britain,54 while for the 
revolutionary left, it was a byword for class compromise. After forty years 
of defeat, the purity of revolutionary theory uncoupled from mass prac-
tice is a strange comfort. The left cannot afford to be so dismissive of a 
political culture that had to be broken by capital, that must be unrepre-
sented by the dominant political parties; that expresses sentiments with 
which millions of people can identify; a political culture un-represented 
and unrepresentable by the dominant bloc (including Labour).
The left should remember not the creaking institutions of social democ-
racy that were generating discontent in the 1960s and 1970s, but the 
53 Alison Ayers and Alfredo Saad-Filho, ‘Democracy Against Neoliberalism: 
Paradoxes, Limitations, Transcendence’, Critical Sociology, vol. 41, nos 4–5, 2015.
54 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism, London and New 
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fact that social democracy emerged out of the conflict and strife of war, 
revolution, counter-revolution and economic catastrophe in Europe 
between 1914 and 1945. It was not born in peacetime. It is clear today, 
post-Corbyn, that it will take a revolution to get some social democracy—
that is: mass mobilization, polarization and a significant growth in class 
consciousness. This Corbyn did not have. There was enthusiasm to be 
sure, there were crowds, there was the singing of his name, but it was 
a spectacle that had nowhere to go and the Labour Party was unable to 
tap or engage with that wider sentiment. Momentum was largely turned 
inward, defending the Corbyn leadership, as it probably had to do in 
an organization whose dominant factions were on 24/7 manoeuvres 
against him. Again, the cost of inhabiting a house with diametrically 
opposed visions is paralysis.
The kind of popular power as a transformative capacity that would be 
needed to break through into the existing institutions of capitalist democ-
racy so as to begin to effect change suggests we are dealing here with the 
paradox of a revolutionary form and a social-democratic content. But for 
a period of time this might be a necessary and an enabling contradiction. 
It would open up crucial avenues of historical experience in terms of 
participation, agency, problem solving, experimenting, democratizing, 
solidarity building, and so forth. It would be a historical experience that 
would at some point likely pose the old questions but which, without 
the historical experience itself, can only sound abstract and doctrinaire; 
namely whether the revolutionary form should be adapted to the social-
democratic content or whether the social-democratic content should be 
expanded to match the revolutionary form. In evaluating that dilemma, 
people would have to weigh up the known risks of seriously challenging 
the power and wealth of an extremely violent and sociopathic class, or 
of remaining within the existing mode of production and accepting the 
associated risks of economic crisis, war and ecological catastrophe. Now, 
take a look at the Labour front bench and the rows of gargoyles arranged 
behind them and ask whether a word of truth about the dangers facing 
us would ever fall from their lips, or whether a muscle in their collective 
body would ever twitch in the direction of addressing those dangers. 
After Corbyn the left in Labour needs to try something new, something 
different; something intellectually and politically post-Labour.
